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1. Introduction  
A supply chain can be defined as a network of facilities and distribution options that 
performs the functions of procurement of materials, transformation of these materials into 
intermediate and finished products, and the distribution of these finished products to 
customers.  Different entities in a supply chain operate subject to different sets of constraints 
and objectives under different industrial environments. Each member of a decentralized 
supply chain has its own decision rights to optimize its costs or benefits.  Recently, the topic 
of decentralized supply chain modelling and analysis has been of great interest.  Most of the 
studies on decentralized supply chain modelling have focused on designing a mechanism to 
fully integrate these individualistic decisions in order to ensure that the decision outcome of 
an individual member of the supply chain is in accordance with the decision outcome of the 
entire supply chain (Cachon & Lariviere, 2001; Moinzadeh and Bassok, 1998; Tsay et al., 1999). 
Perfect coordination mechanisms allow the decentralized supply chain to perform as well as 
a centralized one, in which all decisions are made by a single entity to maximize supply-
chain-wide profits.  Several types of contractual agreements which may determine incentive 
mechanisms to integrate a decentralized supply chain, inclunding profit sharing (Atkinson, 
1979; Jeuland and Shugan, 1983), consignment (Kandel, 1996), buy-backs (Pasternack, 1985; 
Emmons & Gilbert, 1987), quantity-flexibility (Tsay & Lovejoy, 1999), revenue sharing 
(Giannoccaro & Pontrandolfo, 2004; Cachon & Lariviere, 2005; Chang & Hsueh, 2006, 2007), 
revenue allocation rules (Shah et al., 2001), and quantity discounts (Dolan, 1987), etc. 
One of these contractual agreements, revenue sharing is a mechanism that is gaining 
popularity in practice and in research.  Shah et al. (2001) have adopted Nash’s game theory 
to formulate a model which explores a fair revenue allocation mechanism among the 
members of a multi-tier supply chain. The model provides a compromise solution of 
maximized revenue for each individual member of the supply chain under the inventory 
and production constraints.  Giannoccaro & Pontrandolfo (2004) have extended the revenue 
sharing contract of two-tier to a three-tier supply chain model. Cachon & Lariviere (2005) 
have presented the revenue sharing contract concept and discussed its influence on supply 
chain performances. The revenue sharing contract can be described by two parameters, 
retail price and retailers’ revenue retention ratio. Chang & Hsueh (2006, 2007) extended 
Giannoccaro & Pontrandolfo (2004) to explore a three-tier supply chain integration problem 
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with the time-varying multi-period demand and the constant price elasticity demand 
function.  Multiple objective programming techniques are applied to determine the revenue 
sharing contract parameters, the purchasing price and revenue sharing ratios among the 
members of the supply chain.  In order to heighten the incentive cooperation, equilibrium 
behaviors for decentralized supply chains are included and regarded as compromise 
benchmarks for supply chain integration. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, two multi-period three-
tier supply chain network models are presented. A equilibrium model of decentralized 
supply chain network is introduced first. Herein the optimality conditions of the various 
decision-makers are derived and formulated as a finite-dimensional variational inequality 
model. A multi-objectives programming model to determine the revenue sharing constract 
parameters is given next. In Section 3, a well-known solution algorithm, diagonalization 
method, is presented to solve the variation inequility model of supply chain 
networkequilibrium. In Section 4, a supply chain network example is provided for the 
demonstration.  Conclusions are given in the end. 
2. Model formulation 
The supply chain network is composed of m manufacturers, n distributors, and o retailers.  
The other assumptions about the members of the supply chain network are summarized as 
follows: 
1. To accommodate changes in demand, the product inventory within this supply chain 
network is stored at the manufacturers’ warehouses so that the manufacturers will have 
sufficient inventory or production capacity to satisfy the distributors’ demand in the 
current time period. 
2. The total costs of the manufacturers have to bear are production cost, inventory cost and 
transportation cost. The distributors are only responsible for the product handling and 
purchasing costs. The retailers are directly associated with the market demand and 
responsible for transportation costs and purchasing cost. All the cost functions for the 
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers are continuous, convex, and nonlinear functions. 
3. The demand function is a known function which can describe the relationship between 
the market demand and market price. 
2.1 Notations 
( )kd t : The product demand of retailer k at time period t 
( )if e : The production cost of manufacturer i at time period e 
( )
i
f e : The average production cost of manufacturer i at time period e 
( )ih t : The inventory cost of manufacturer i at time period t  
( )ih t : The average inventory cost of manufacturer i at time period t 
( )iI t : The inventory level of manufacturer i at time period t 
( )jL t : The product quantity of distributor j at time period t 
( )jm t : The product handling cost of distributor j at time period t 
( )jm t : The average product handling cost of distributor j at time period t 
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( )iq e : The production quantity of manufacturer i at time period e 
( )ijq t : 
The product quantity delivered from manufacturer i to distributor j at time period 
t  
( )ijtq e : 
The product quantity produced by manufacturer i at time period e and delivered 
to distributor j at time period t  
( )jkq t : The product quantity delivered from distributor j to retailer k at time period t 
( )ijs t : The transportation cost from manufacturer i to distributor j at time period t 
( )ijs t : 
The average transportation cost from manufacturer i to distributor j at time period 
t  
( )jks t : The transportation cost from distributor j to retailer k at time period t  
( )jks t : The average transportation cost from distributor j to retailer k at time period t 
ijT : The leading time between manufacturer i and distributor j 
jkT : The leading time between distributor j and retailer k  
, ,i j kz z z : The profit for manufacturers, distributors, and retailers  
* * *, ,i j kz z z : The maximum profit for manufacturers, distributors, and retailers 
, ,E E Ei j kz z z : The equilibrium profit for manufacturers, distributors, and retailers 
3
kφ : The ratio of the retail revenues retained by retailer k 
2
jkφ : The ratio of the wholesale revenue retained by distributor j, which is resulted from the transaction between distributor j and retailer k  
1( )ij tρ : The selling price of manufacturer i to distributor j at time period t 
2( )j tρ : The selling price of distributor j at time period t 
3( )k tρ : The selling price of retailer k at time period t 
2.2 Market equilibrium model 
Chang & Hsueh (2006) first focus on decision behaviours of manufacturers and then turn to 
decision behaviours of distributors and retailers, subsequently. A complete equilibrium 
model is finally constructed. 
2.2.1 The manufacturers’ optimality conditions 
Each manufacturer’s behaviour of seeking profit maximization can be expressed as follows. 
 1ijmax   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) i ij i i ij
jt e t jt
t q t f e h t s tπ ρ= − − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑   (1) 
subject to 
 ( ) ( )i ijt
jt
q e q e e= ∀∑   (2) 
 
,
( ) ( )i ijt
j e t
I t q e t
<
= ∀∑   (3) 
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ij
ij
( -T )
-T
( ) ( ) ,ij ij t
e t
q t q e j t
≤
= ∀∑  (4) 
 ( ) 0          , ,ijtq e j t e≥ ∀  (5) 
 1( ) 0          ,ij t j tρ ≥ ∀  (6) 
Eq. (1) designates that the profit of a manufacturer is the difference in total revenues and 
total costs.  Eq. (2) defines that the entire volume of production of manufacturer i at time 
period e is equal to the sum of the quantities shipped from this manufacturer to all 
distributors after time period e.  Eq. (3) defines that the entire volume of inventory at time 
period t is equal to the sum of the quantities produced by the manufacturer i before time 
period t. Eq. (4) defines that the volume of transaction between manufacturer i and 
distributor j at time period t is equal to the sum of the product quantity produced by 
manufacturer i for distributor j before time period ijt T− .  Note that the production cost 
( )if e  depends upon the entire volume of production at time period e.  The inventory cost 
( )ih t  depends upon the entire volume of inventory at time period t.  The shared transaction 
cost depends upon the volume of transaction at time period t. Eqs. (5) and (6) are 
nonnegative constraints. 
The manufacturers compete in a noncooperative fashion following Nash (1950, 1951).  Each 
manufacturer will determine this optimal production quantity, inventory quantity, 
distribution quantity at each time period.  The optimality conditions for all manufacturers 
simultaneously expressed as Eq. (7). 
 
1* *** *
* * * 1* *
( )  ,  if ( ) 0( )( ) ( )
    , , ,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  ,  if ( ) 0
ij ijtiji i
ijt ijt ijt ij ijt
t q es tf e h t
i j t e
q e q e q e t q e
ρ
ρ
⎧= >∂∂ ∂ ⎪+ + ∀⎨∂ ∂ ∂ ≥ =⎪⎩
      (7) 
2.2.2 The distributors’ optimality conditions 
Herein, each distributor’s behavior of seeking profit maximization can be expressed as 
follows. 
 2 1j ijmax    ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j jk ij ij ij j
t k it t
t q t t T q t T m tπ ρ ρ= − − − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (8) 
subject to 
 ( ) ( )j ij ij
i
L t q t T t= − ∀∑  (9) 
 ( ) ( )         ij ij jk
i k
q t T q t t− = ∀∑ ∑  (10) 
 ( ) 0       ,ijq t i t≥ ∀  (11) 
 ( ) 0      ,jkq t k t≥ ∀  (12) 
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 2( ) 0      j t tρ ≥ ∀  (13) 
Eq. (8) designates that the profit of a distributor is the difference in total revenues and total 
costs.  Eq. (9) defines that the entire product quantity of distributor j at period t is equal to 
the sum of purchase quantity from all manufacturers at the corresponding time period t- ijT .  
The handling cost ( )jm t  depends upon the entire product quantity at period t.  Eq. (10) 
ensures that the received total product quantity of the distributor j from all manufacturers 
departing at time period t- ijT  must be greater than or equal to the product quantity of the 
distributor j which can be distributed to all retailers at time period t.  Eqs. (11) ~ (13) are 
nonnegative constraints. 
Congenially, the distributors compete in a noncooperative manner, too.  At each time 
period, each distributor will determine the optimal order quantity with each manufacturer 
as well as distribution quantity for each retailer. The optimality conditions for all 
distributors satisfy Eqs. (14)~(16).  
 
* **
1*
* * *
( )  ,  if ( ) 0( )
( )      , ,
 ( ) ( )  ,  if ( ) 0
j ij ijj
ij ij
ij ij j ij ij
t q t Tm t
t T i j t
q t T t q t T
γρ γ
⎧= − >∂ ⎪− + ∀⎨− ≥ − =⎪⎩
 (14) 
 
2* *
*
2* *
( )  ,  if ( ) 0
( )      , ,
( )  ,  if ( ) 0
j jk
j
j jk
t q t
t j k t
t q t
ργ ρ
⎧= >⎪ ∀⎨≥ =⎪⎩
 (15) 
 ( ) 0 ,j t j tγ ≥ ∀  (16) 
Note that ( )j tγ  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (10) for distributor j at 
time period t. 
2.2.3 The retailers’ optimality conditions 
On the analogy of the well-known spatial price equilibrium conditions, the equilibrium 
conditions for each retailer at each time period can be stated as follows: 
 
3* *
* *
3* *
( )  ,  if ( ) 0
( ) ( )      , ,
( )  ,  if ( ) 0
k jk
j jk jk
k jk
t q t
t T s t j k t
t q t
ρρ ρ
⎧= >⎪− + ∀⎨≥ =⎪⎩
 (17) 
 
* 3*
*
* 3*
( )  ,  if ( ) 0
( )      ,
( )  ,  if ( ) 0
jk jk k
j
k
jk jk k
j
q t T t
d t k t
q t T t
ρ
ρ
⎧= − >⎪⎪ ∀⎨≤ − =⎪⎪⎩
∑
∑  (18) 
Eq. (17) ensures that the product will be distributed to the retailer k from distributor j at time 
period t, if the price charged by the distributor j for the product at time period jkt T−  plus 
the transportation cost faced by retailer k at time period t doesn’t exceed the price that 
consumers of retailer k are willing to pay for the product at time period t.  Eq. (18) states that 
the total product quantity distributed to the retailer k from all distributors at time period 
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t jkT−  is equal to the customers’ demands of retailer k at time period t, if the price the 
consumers of retailer k are willing to pay for the product at time period t is positive. 
2.2.4 Equilibrium condition of the supply chain 
The equilibrium state of the multi-period supply chain is one where the time-space flows 
between the tiers of the supply chain network coincide and the product shipments and 
prices simultaneously satisfy the all optimality conditions, i.e., Eqs. (7) and (14)~(18).  
Furthermore, they can also be expressed as a variational inequality problem. 
** *
* *
* * *
*
* * *
*
* * *
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) (
iji i
ij ijt ijt
ijte ijt ijt ijt
j
ij ij j ij ij ij ij
ijt ij ij
j j jk jk
s tf e h t
t q e q e
q e q e q e
m t
t T t q t T q t T
q t T
t t q t q t
ρ
ρ γ
γ ρ
⎡ ⎤∂∂ ∂ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥+ + − − +⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤∂ ⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥− + − − − − +⎣ ⎦∂ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦
∑
∑
* * *
* * * * * * *
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0
ij ij jk j j
jkt jt i k
j jk jk k jk jk jk jk k k k
jkt kt j
q t T q t t t
t T s t t q t q t q t T d t t t
γ γ
ρ ρ ρ ρ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − − − +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + − − + − − − ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
  (19) 
The equilibrium state of the multi-period supply chain is one where the time-space flows 
between the tiers of the supply chain network coincide and the product shipments and 
prices simultaneously satisfy the all optimality conditions, i.e., Eqs. (7), and (14)~(18).  Since 
the amount of products must follow the flow conservation constraints, each product 
received by a retailer must come from some manufacturer by way of some distributor.  
Therefore, Chang & Hsueh (2007) define such a product flow as a time-dependent path flow 
pkq (e,t)  where a path p is composed of a link ( , )i j  and a link ( , )j k .  It means that the 
products are produced by manufacturer i at time period e, and then are delivered to 
distributor j and retailer k at time period t, sequentially.  The equilibrium conditions of 
whole supply chain network can then be simplified as Eq. (18) and the following: 
3
3
if 0
if 0
* ** ** *
k ij jk pkij j ij *i i
jk ij * *
ij ij k ij jk pk
ρ (t T T )  ,   q (e,t)s (t) m (t T )f (e) h (t)
s (t T )   p,k,t,e
q (e,t) q (t) ρ (t T T )  ,   q (e,t)
⎧= + + >∂ + +∂ + ⎪+ + + ∀⎨∂ ∂ ≥ + + =⎪⎩
 (20) 
Let Eq. (21) stands. Equilibrium conditions (18) and (20) can be transformed into the 
following variational inequality formulation (22) with the constraint set Ω, i.e., (2)~(6), 
(9)~(13). 
 ˆ
ij j iji i
pk jk ij
ij ij
s (t) m (t T )f (e) h (t)
c (e,t) s (t T )
q (e,t) q (t)
∂ + +∂ += + + +∂ ∂  (21) 
3ˆ 0* * * * * *pk k ij jk pk pk jk jk k k k
pket kt j
c (e,t) ρ (t T T ) q (e,t) q (e,t) q (t T ) d (t) ρ (t) ρ (t)⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + + − + − − − ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑  (22) 
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The first term of Eq. (22) is a path-based variational inequiality formulation and can be 
equivalently transformed into a link-based VI one (Chen, 1999).  Therefore, the variational 
inequiality model for a decentralized supply chain network can then be established as 
follows (Chang & Hsueh, 2007). 
 
3 3 0
* ** *
ij j ij* *i i
ij ij ij ij
ij ijijet ijt
* * * * *
jk jk jk jk jk k k k
jkt kt j
s (t) m (t T )f (e) h (t)
q (e,t) q (e,t) q (t) q (t)
q (e,t) q (t)
s (t) q (t) q (t) q (t T ) d (t) ρ (t) ρ (t)
⎡ ⎤ ∂ + +∂ + ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− + −⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − + − − − ≥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 (23) 
subject to: Eqs. (2)~(6) for all manufacturer i and Eqs. (9)~(13) for all distributor j. 
2.3 Revenue sharing model for supply chain integration 
The unique feature of revenue sharing contract is that the sellers will provide lower selling 
price to the buyers and the buyers will share part of the product sales revenue with the 
sellers.  About the revenue sharing rule, Chang & Hsueh (2006) assume that the retail sales 
revenue can be shared within members of the third tier, second tier, and first tier of the 
supply chain network and the wholesale sales revenue can be shared within members of the 
second tier and first tier of supply chain network. In other words, excluding the portion of 
retail sales retained by each retailer, the remaining retail sales revenue will be returned to 
the distributors, and the manufacturers will receive their shares of the retail sales revenue 
after the distributors have retained their portion of retail sales revenue. The distributors 
retain their portion of wholesale sales revenue, the residual wholesale sales revenue will be 
returned to the manufacturers. The sales revenue resulted from selling products from 
manufacturers to distributors are solely retained by the manufacturers. Under such 
integration stipulation, the retailers’ profits and distributors’ profits are defined as shown in 
Eq. (24) and (25), respectively. 
 3 3 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k k k k jk j jk jk jk
t jt jt
z t d t s t t T q t T kφ ρ ρ= − − − − ∀∑ ∑ ∑  (24) 
 2 3 3 2 2 1(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )j jk k k k jk j jk ij ij ij ij j
kt kt it t
z t d t t q t t T q t T m t jφ φ ρ φ ρ ρ= − + − − − − ∀∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (25) 
The manufacturers’ profits are defined as follows. 
 
2 3 3 2 2 1(1 )(1 ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
i jk k k k jk j jk ij ijt i
jkt jkt jt e t e
i ij
t jt
z t d t t q t t q e f e
h t s t i
φ φ ρ φ ρ ρ
≤
= − − + − + −
− − ∀
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑  (26) 
As a result, the profitability of members in the supply chain will differ according to the 
different buyers’ revenue sharing ratio.  Since the buyers and sellers’ benefits are in conflict 
with each other and it is almost impossible to maximize the benefits for every member of the 
supply chain, only a compromised result can be achieved.  Therefore, Chang & Hsueh (2006) 
have applied the compromise programming theory to establish an intertemporal supply 
chain revenue sharing model as follows: 
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 max  
EE E
j ji i k k
S E S E S E
i j ki i j j k k
z zz z z z
z z z z z z
μ −− −= + +− − −∑ ∑ ∑  (27) 
subject to: 
• flow conservation constraints 
(2)~(6) for all i 
(9)~(13) for all j 
 ( ) ( )     ,k jk jk
j
d t q t T k t= − ∀∑  (28) 
• definitional constraints 
(24)~(26) 
• boundary constaints 
 si iz z i≤ ∀  (29) 
 sj jz z j≤ ∀  (30) 
 sk kz z k≤ ∀  (31) 
 1 1*( ) ( ) , ,ij ijt t i j tρ ρ≤ ∀   (32) 
 2 2*( ) ( ) ,j jt t j tρ ρ≤ ∀  (33) 
 1 2( ) ( ) , ,ij j ijt t T i j tρ ρ≤ + ∀  (34) 
 2 3( ) ( ) , ,j k jkt t T j k tρ ρ≤ + ∀  (35) 
• value range constraints 
 3( ) 0 ,k t k tρ ≥ ∀  (36) 
 20 1 ,jk j kφ≤ ≤ ∀  (37) 
 30 1k kφ≤ ≤ ∀  (38) 
 
The objective of the compromise programming model is to maximize the sum of relative 
distance from the negative solution ( ), ,E E Ei j kz z z , as shown in Eq. (27).  It is well known that 
the profit of each individual in the perfect competition market is lowest.  Furthermore, in 
order to avoid the rejection of the revenue sharing contracts due to the fact that the 
compromised profit solution provide in the revenue sharing contract for each member of the 
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supply chain is less than the profits made at market equilibrium before revenue sharing.  
We let the negative solution ( ), ,E E Ei j kz z z  of the proposed compromise programming model 
be the equilibrium profits for manufacturers, distributors, and retailers that are obtained 
from the variational inequalities, Eq. (23). On the other hand, the share profits for 
manufacturers, distributors, and retailers are very important parameters in Eq. (27).  Based 
on fairness doctrine, we suggest that the excess profit resulted from the supply chain 
integration must be shared by all the members in the supply chain. 
In addition, the feasible solution is defined by flow conservation constraints, definitional 
constraints, boundary constraints, and value boudary constriants.  Eqs. (2)~(6), (9)~(13), and 
(28) are flow conservation constrints.  Eq. (28) limits the total market demand for retailer k at 
time t, which is equal to the total product quantity delivered from all distributors at time 
jkt T− .  Eqs. (24)~(26) define the profits of members in the supply chain. 
There are three kinds of boundary constraints in this model. The first one is about the profits 
limits.  Eqs. (29)~(31) require the profits for the manufacturers, distributors, and retailers 
must be less than the share profits negotiated with each member of the supply chain. They 
also ensure that each relative distance from the negative solution is between 0 and 1. The 
second one is about upper limits of selling prices.  Eqs. (32)~(33) set the upper limits of 
selling prices be equal to the corresponding equilibrated prices. The equilibrated 
manufacturers’ and distributors’ selling prices can be obtained from the variational 
inequalities, Eq. (23) and estimated by using Eq. (7) and Eqs. (14), (15) respectively.  The 
third one is to avoid a singular phenomenon, i.e.  selling prices are less than prime costs, Eq. 
(34) requires the distributors’ selling prices in each time period ijt T+  must be greater than 
the manufacturers’ selling prices in each time period t.  Eq. (35) requires the retailers’ selling 
price in each time period jkt T+  must be greater than the distributors’ selling price in each 
time period t. 
Value boudary constriants includ Eqs. (36) and (37)~(38).  Eq. (36) limits all retailers’ selling 
price to be nonnegative. Eq. (37) and (38) limit each buyer’s revenue sharing ratio, regardless 
the transaction type, to be between 0 and 1. 
3. Solution algorithm 
Chang & Hsueh (2007) adopted a diagonalization method to solve the variation inequility 
model (23).  It is a well-known solution algorithm for solving the VI problem (Chen, 1999).  
A time-space network representation technique and a two-staged concept are utilized for 
solving such a problem.  They are explained in detail as follows. 
First, we utilize the time-space network representation technique to simplify the procedure 
of solution algorithm. Given a two-manufacturer two-distributor two-retailer network with 
three time-dependent costumers’ demands, and five time periods, the time-space network 
can be drawn in Fig. 1. At each time period, the static network is reproduced and each 
manufacturer node is duplicated.  In addition, one time-independent dummy origin node O 
and three time-dependent dummy destination nodes S3, S4, S5 are created. Four types of 
links are present in this time-space network. 
1. The bold broken line that connects dummy origin node O and a duplicated 
manufacturer node Mi’ is a dummy link.  Similarly, the bold broken line that connects  
a retailer node Rk and a dummy destination node St is also a dummy link. The costs of 
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Fig. 1. Time-space network of a three-tier supply chain (Chang & Hsueh, 2007) 
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these dummy links are equal to zero. Having these dummy nodes and dummy links, 
the time-dependent costumers’ demands are distributed over the supply chain from a 
dummy origin node to the corresponding dummy destination node. 
2. The dotted line that connects a duplicated manufacturer node Mi’ and a manufacturer 
node Mi at the same time period bears the products produced and sent out by 
manufacturer i at the same time period e.  The cost of this link is marginal production 
cost i( ) ( , )if e q e e∂ ∂  where ( , ) ( , )i ij
j
q e e q e e=∑ . 
3. The fine broken line that connects a duplicated manufacturer node Mi’ and a 
manufacturer node Mi between diffident time periods bears the products produced by 
manufacturer i at time period e and sent out at following time period t.  The cost of this 
link is marginal production cost ( ) ( , )i if e q e t∂ ∂  and marginal inventory cost 
( ) ( , )i ih t q e t∂ ∂  where ( , )iq e t = ( , )ij
j
q e t∑ . 
4. The solid line that connects a manufacturer node Mi and a distributor node jD  bears 
the products delivered from manufacturer i to distributor j at time period t.  The cost of 
this link is marginal transportation cost ( )ij ijds t dq (t)  and marginal handling cost 
j ij ijm (t T ) q (t)∂ + ∂ .  Furthermore, the solid line that connects a distributor node jD  and 
a retailer node kR  bears the product delivered from distributor j to retailer k at time 
period t.  The cost of this link is transportation cost jks (t) . 
Second, since the decision variables of the proposed variation inequiality model (23) include 
flow variables { }( ), ( ), ( )ijt ij jkq e q t q t  and price variables 3( )k tρ , the flow variables and the price 
variables are calculate separately.  The detailed steps of solution algorithm are stated as 
follows: 
Step 0: Initialization. 
Step 0.1: Set l=0. 
Step 0.2: Assign the maximum demand quantity of each retailer at time period t to 
the empty time-space network in order to find an initial flow solution 
{ }0 0 0( , ), ( ), ( )ij ij jkq e t q t q t .  
Step 0.3: Calculate the initial price of each retailer by 3 0 0 0ˆ( ) , if ( ,t) 0k pk pkt c (e,t) q eρ = >  
according to the initial flow solution. 
Step 1: Diagonalization operation. 
Step 1.1: Set l=l+1. 
Step 1.2: Fix the all retailers’ price 3 1( )lk tρ −  and the flows for all time-space links 
other than on the subject time-space link at the current level, i.e., 1 1l l-ij\q (e,t)
−
q  or 
1 1l l-
ij\q (t)
−
q .  Solve the following VI model (39) or (40) to find a flow solution 
{ }( , ) , ( ) , ( )l l lij ij jkq e t q t q t . 
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
11
ˆ
ˆ ,
* l l- * l * l
ijet ij ij ij ij
ijet
l- l l* l * *
ijet ij ij ij ij
ijet
f \q (e,t) ,q (e,t) q (e,t) q (e,t)
h \q e t ,q e,t q e,t q e,t
−
−
⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦
∑
∑
q
q
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 ( )( ) ( ) ( )* *ˆ l lijt ij ij ij
ijt
s q t q t q t⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦∑ ( )( ) ( ) ( )* *,ˆ ij l lj t T ij ij ij
ijt
m q t q t q t+ ⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦∑  (39) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0l l* *jk jk jk
jkt
s t q t q t⎡ ⎤+ − ≥⎣ ⎦∑  
( ) ( ) ( )* *ˆ , , llijet ij ij
ijet
f q e t q e t⎡ ⎤−⎣ ⎦∑ q ( ) ( ) ( )* *ˆ , , llijet ij ij
ijet
h q e t q e t⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦∑ q  
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )* *ˆ l lijt ij ij ij
ijt
s q t q t q t⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦∑ ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )11 * *,ˆ \ ,ij l l llj t T ij ij ij ij
ijt
m q q t q t q t q t
−−
+ ⎡ ⎤+ −⎣ ⎦∑  (40) 
0* l * ljk jk jk
jkt
s (t) q (t) q (t)⎡ ⎤+ − ≥⎣ ⎦∑  
Where 
 
( )ˆ i
ijet
ij
f e
f i, j,e,t
q (e,t)
∂= ∀∂  (41) 
 ˆ ,iijet
ij
h (t)
h i, j,e t
q (e,t)
∂= ∀∂  (42) 
 ˆ
ij ij ij
ijt
ij ij ij
s (t) s (t) ds (t)
s i, j,t
q (e,t) q (t) dq (t)
∂ ∂= = = ∀∂ ∂  (43) 
 
( )
ˆ
( )ij
j ij
j,t T
ij
m t T
m j,t
q t
+
∂ += ∀∂  (44) 
Step 1.3: According to the resulted flow solution { }( , ) , ( ) , ( )l l lij ij jkq e t q t q t , calculate the 
corresponding price of each retailer 3( )lk tρ  as follows. 
 3 ˆ( ) ( ) if ( ) 0l l lk pk pkρ t c e,t ,  q e,t= >  (45) 
Step 2: Convergence check. 
If 1max ( , ) ( , )l lij ij
ijet
q e t q e t ε−− ≤ , 1max ( ) ( )l lij ij
ijt
q t q t ε−− ≤ , 1max ( ) ( )l ljk jk
jkt
q t q t ε−− ≤ , and 
3 3 1max ( ) ( )l lk k
kt
t tρ ρ ε−− ≤ , then stop; otherwise go to Step 1.1. 
4. Numerical example 
4.1 Input data 
The numerical example of Nagurney and Toyasaki (2003) is modified and extended from 
one-period problem to multi-period problem. The network consists of two manufacturers, 
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two distributors, ten retailers, and five time periods.  Each of the transportation times is one 
period. The production cost and inventory cost functions for the manufacturers are 
respectively given by: 
 2 1 2( ) 2.5 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ; 1,2,3i i if e q e q e q e q e i e= + + ∀ =  (46) 
 ]1 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0.2 ( ) 0.4 ( ) ; 1 ~ 3i ijt ijt
e t
h t t e q e q e q e q e i t
≤
⎡= − + + + ∀ =⎣∑  (47) 
The transportation cost functions faced by the manufacturers and associated with the 
distributors are given by: 
 2( ) 0.5 ( ) 3.5 ( ) ; ; 1,2,3ij ij ijs t q t q t i j t= + ∀ =  (48) 
The handling cost functions of the distributors are given by: 
 
22
1
( ) 0.5 ( 1) , 2,3j ij
i
m t q t j t
=
⎡ ⎤= − ∀ =⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑  (49) 
The transportation cost functions faced by the retailers and associated with the distributors 
are given by: 
 ( ) ( 1) 5 ; ; 3,4,5jk jks t q t j k t= − + ∀ =  (50) 
The demand functions at the demand markets are: 
 ( )3 3'
'
( ) 2 (3) 0.1 ( )k k k k
k k
d t t tρ ρ δ
≠
= − − +∑  (51) 
where ( )k tδ  is a constant of demand function of retailer k at time period t.  They are listed 
in Table 1. 
 
retailer 
period 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
3 245 187 174 233 155 178 203 237 219 207 
4 326 334 278 346 287 259 290 265 327 322 
5 196 242 261 240 285 253 262 253 267 227 
Table 1. Constants of demand functions 
4.2 Test results 
4.2.1 An equilibrated solution 
The proposed diagonalization method was implemented in Visual C++ to solve the 
proposed network equilibrium of decentralized supply chain network. The yielded 
equilibrium flow patterns and selling prices are shown in Table 2. The equilibrium profits of 
members of supply chain network are shown in Table 3. The total profit is 3082.77.  
Manufacturers have most of them.  Retailer 6 is not chosen. Retailer 3, 7, and 10 have negtive 
profit due to perfect competition. 
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Furthermore, the rationale of the proposed variational inequalities model and associated 
solution algorithm can be verified by checking if the resulting total costs of supply path 
satisfy the network equilibrium conditions, i.e. Eqs. (18) and (20). The check results of 
equilibrium condition (18) are listed in Table 4. At time period 3, products are only 
distributed to Retailer 1, 4, and 8. Too lower prices make no product distributed to those 
retailer markets. The computed equilibrium customers’ demand is equal to the product 
quality delivered from all distributors. For example, the total amount of products is 8.06 
which are delivered from distributor 1 and 2, as shown in Table 2. 
 
time period t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 
e=1 3.48 e=1 1.76 e=1 0.00
  e=2 6.48 e=2 0.001->1 
    e=3 5.38
- - 
e=1 3.48 e=1 1.76 e=1 0.00
  e=2 6.48 e=2 0.001->2 
    e=3 5.38
- - 
e=1 3.48 e=1 1.76 e=1 0.00
  e=2 6.48 e=2 0.002->1 
    e=3 5.38
- - 
e=1 3.48 e=1 1.76 e=1 0.00
  e=2 6.48 e=2 0.00
product quantity 
produced by 
manufacturer i at 
time period e and 
distributed to 
distributor j at time 
period t 
2->2 
    e=3 5.38
- - 
1->1 3.48 8.24 5.38 - - 
1->2 3.48 8.24 5.38 - - 
2->1 3.48 8.24 5.38 - - 
product quantity 
distributed  from 
manufacturer i to 
distributor j at time 
period t 2->2 3.48 8.24 5.38 - - 
1->1 - 4.03 2.02 0.00 - 
1->2 - 0.00 4.07 0.00 - 
1->3 - 0.00 0.00 0.70 - 
1->4 - 0.96 7.14 0.00 - 
1->5 - 0.00 0.00 6.86 - 
1->6 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
1->7 - 0.00 0.00 0.96 - 
1->8 - 1.98 0.00 0.00 - 
1->9 - 0.00 2.27 2.24 - 
1->10 - 0.00 0.99 0.00 - 
2->1 - 4.03 2.02 0.00 - 
2->2 - 0.00 4.07 0.00 - 
2->3 - 0.00 0.00 0.70 - 
2->4 - 0.96 7.14 0.00 - 
2->5 - 0.00 0.00 6.86 - 
2->6 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
2->7 - 0.00 0.00 0.96 - 
2->8 - 1.98 0.00 0.00 - 
2->9 - 0.00 2.27 2.24 - 
product quantity 
distributed from 
distributor j to 
retailer k at time 
interval t 
2->10 - 0.00 0.99 0.00 - 
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time period t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 
1 - - 8.06 0.00 0.00 
2 - - 1.91 0.00 0.00 
3 - - 0.00 3.96 0.00 
4 - - 0.00 4.03 8.13 
5 - - 0.00 14.29 0.00 
6 - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 - - 4.54 1.98 0.00 
8 - - 0.00 1.41 0.00 
9 - - 13.72 0.00 1.92 
product quantity of 
customers of retailer 
k 
10 - - 0.00 4.49 0.00 
1->1 71.97 91.49 75.47 - - 
1->2 71.97 91.49 75.47 - - 
2->1 71.97 91.49 75.47 - - 
price of 
manufacturer i for 
distributor j 
2->2 71.97 91.49 75.47 - - 
1 - 78.94 109.98 86.24 - 
price of distributor j
2 - 78.94 109.98 86.24 - 
1 - - 87.97 114.99 58.47 
2 - - 61.69 117.04 82.68 
3 - - 54.84 91.85 91.94 
4 - - 84.89 120.12 81.63 
5 - - 44.84 96.59 98.10 
6 - - 56.95 81.85 90.42 
7 - - 70.11 98.17 92.20 
8 - - 85.92 85.01 88.47 
9 - - 78.53 115.25 93.48 
price of retailer k 
10 - - 72.21 113.97 71.63 
Table 2. Equilibrated solution of supply chain network 
 
member 
equilibrated 
solution 
manufacturer 1, 2 1094.03 
distributor 1, 2 218.13 
retailer 1 69.02 
retailer 2 55.61 
retailer 3 -3.38 
retailer 4 148.68 
retailer 5 138.93 
retailer 6 - 
retailer 7 -0.47 
retailer 8 13.69 
retailer 9 36.49 
retailer 10 -0.12 
total profit 3082.77 
Table 3. Profits of members of the supply chain (equilibrated solution) 
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The check results of equilibrium condition (20) are summarized in Table 5 ~ Table 7.  The 
equilibrated supply path cost is obtained by summing all relative costs along the path.  For 
example, consider supply path M1’åM1åD1åR4 producing and sending at time period 1, 
the total cost is 84.89. 
1 11 1
1 1 1 4 14
1 11 11
(1) (1) (2)
ˆ (1 1) (2) 64.98 6.98 6.97 5.96 84.89
(1 1) (1) (1)
M ' M D R
f ds m
c , s
q , dq q
→ → →
∂ ∂= + + + = + + + =∂ ∂  (52) 
It is observed that the total costs of each supply path arriving at the same retailer and time 
period are equal to the corresponding retailer’s price. For example, there are four supply 
paths to Retailer 4 and they arrive at the time period 3. Their total costs are 84.89.  There are 
eight supply paths to Retailer 1 and they arrive at the time period 4. Half of them are 
manufactured at time period 1, but delivered to distributors till time period 2. Incured 
inventory costs are counted.  Total costs of eight supply paths are the same and equal to the 
coressponding retailer price, as shown in Table 6. 
 
 
 
t = 3 t = 4 t = 5 
retailer 
price demand
distibuted
amount 
price demand
distibuted
amount 
price demand 
distibuted 
amount 
1 87.97(1) 8.06 8.06 114.99(4) 4.03 4.03 58.47 0.00 0.00 
2 61.69 0.00 0.00 117.04(2) 8.13 8.13 82.68 0.00 0.00 
3 54.84 0.00 0.00 91.85 0.00 0.00 91.94(4) 1.41 1.41 
4 84.89(3) 1.91 1.91 120.12(1) 14.29 14.29 81.63 0.00 0.00 
5 44.84 0.00 0.00 96.59 0.00 0.00 98.10(1) 13.72 13.72 
6 56.95 0.00 0.00 81.85 0.00 0.00 90.42 0.00 0.00 
7 70.11 0.00 0.00 98.17 0.00 0.00 92.20(3) 1.92 1.92 
8 85.92(2) 3.96 3.96 85.01 0.00 0.00 88.47 0.00 0.00 
9 78.53 0.00 0.00 115.25(3) 4.54 4.54 93.48(2) 4.49 4.49 
10 72.21 0.00 0.00 113.97(5) 1.98 1.98 71.63 0.00 0.00 
 
Table 4. Check results of equilibrium condition (18) 
 
 
 
path e = 1, t = 1 path e = 1, t = 1 path e = 1, t = 1 
M1-D1-R1 87.97 M1-D1-R4 84.89 M1-D1-R8 85.92 
M1-D2-R1 87.97 M1-D2-R4 84.89 M1-D2-R8 85.92 
M2-D1-R1 87.97 M2-D1-R4 84.89 M2-D1-R8 85.92 
M2-D2-R1 87.97 M2-D2-R4 84.89 M2-D2-R8 85.92 
price of R1 87.97 price of R4 84.89 price of R8 85.92 
 
Table 5. Check results of equilibrium condition (20) -- supply path costs (arrival at t = 3) 
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path e = 1, t =2 e = 2, t = 2 path e = 1, t =2 e = 2, t = 2 
M1-D1-R1 114.99 114.99 M1-D1-R2 117.04 117.04 
M1-D2-R1 114.99 114.99 M1-D2-R2 117.04 117.04 
M2-D1-R1 114.99 114.99 M2-D1-R2 117.04 117.04 
M2-D2-R1 114.99 114.99 M2-D2-R2 117.04 117.04 
price of R1 114.99 price of R2 117.04 
path e = 1, t =2 e = 2, t = 2 path e = 1, t =2 e = 2, t = 2 
M1-D1-R4 120.12 120.12 M1-D1-R9 115.25 115.25 
M1-D2-R4 120.12 120.12 M1-D2-R9 115.25 115.25 
M2-D1-R4 120.12 120.12 M2-D1-R9 115.25 115.25 
M2-D2-R4 120.12 120.12 M2-D2-R9 115.25 115.25 
price of R4 120.12 price of R9 115.25 
path e = 1, t =2 e = 2, t = 2    
M1-D1-R10 113.97 113.97    
M1-D2-R10 113.97 113.97    
M2-D1-R10 113.97 113.97    
M2-D2-R10 113.97 113.97    
price of R10 113.97    
 
Table 6. Check results of equilibrium condition (20) -- supply path costs (arrival at t = 4) 
 
path e = 3, t =3 path e = 3, t =3 
M1-D1-R3 91.94 M1-D1-R5 98.10 
M1-D2-R3 91.94 M1-D2-R5 98.10 
M2-D1-R3 91.94 M2-D1-R5 98.10 
M2-D2-R3 91.94 M2-D2-R5 98.10 
price of R3 91.94 price of R5 98.10 
path e = 3, t =3 path e = 3, t =3 
M1-D1-R7 92.20 M1-D1-R9 93.48 
M1-D2-R7 92.20 M1-D2-R9 93.48 
M2-D1-R7 92.20 M2-D1-R9 93.48 
M2-D2-R7 92.20 M2-D2-R9 93.48 
price of R7 92.20 price of R9 93.48 
 
Table 7. Check results of equilibrium condition (20) -- supply path costs (arrival at t = 5) 
4.2.2 A compromise solution 
Subsequently, the following nonlinear programming model is adopted to determine the 
maximal total profit of the centralized supply chain network. 
 
 3max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )k k jk j i i ij
kt jkt jt ie it ijt
t d t s t m t f e h t s tπ ρ= − − − − −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (53) 
 
subject to: (2)~(5) for all i, (9)~(12) for all j, (28), and (36). 
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The LINGO 10.0 package was used to solve this model. The maximum total profit of the 
centralized supply chain network is 3171.81. Consequently, the increment of total profits is 
89.04, compared with equilibrium profits for members of the supply chain network.  Let all 
members of the supply chain network share the increment. 
After obtaining the above data, the LINGO 10.0 package was used to solve the proposed 
revenue sharing compromise model for supply chain integration. Sharing rates of retail 
revenues for retailer k and sharing rates of wholesale revenues for distributor j are 
summarized in Table 8 and Table 9 respectively.  The sharing rate of retail revenue for 
retailer 1 and retailer 10 is 77.44% and 25.12% respectively. Other retailers do not have to 
share their revenues with and distributors.  In addition, the sharing rate of wholesale 
revenues for distributor 1 transacted with retailer 1 is 100% and the sharing rate of 
wholesale revenues for distributor 2 transacted with retailer 1 is 76.85%. Other distributors 
do not have to share their revenues with manufacturers. The compromise flow patterns and 
selling prices are shown in Table 10. 
The solving results of the market equilibrium model and revenue sharing model are 
compared and the profits for members of the supply chain network between the equilibrium 
solution and the compromise solution are listed in Table 11. The total profit of the 
compromise solution is equal to 3171.81; that is the same as the counterpart of the 
centralized supply chain network. 
The comparisons of retail prices and customers’ demands are summarized in Table 12.  Most 
of the retail prices of the compromise solution are greater than the counterpart of the 
equilibrated solution. But the market transaction volume of the compromise solution is less 
than the market transaction volume under market competition condition but the individual 
and the aggregate profits will be greater than the profits under market competition model.  
In other words, such an integration strategy is workable for all members within the supply 
chain. Parts of customers’ surplus are transferred to the members of the supply chain 
network. Therefore, using the proposed revenue sharing model can indeed create win-win 
situation for all members within the supply chain. 
 
 
retailer  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
77.44% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 25.12% 
 
Table 8. Sharing rates of retail revenue for retailers 
 
  
retailer  
distributor 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
2 76.85% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% - 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
 
Table 9. Sharing rates of wholesale revenue for distributors 
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time period t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 
e=1 0.00 e=1 0.00 e=1 0.00
  e=2 0.00 e=2 0.001->1
    e=3 13.61
- - 
e=1 0.00 e=1 0.00 e=1 0.00
  e=2 1.62 e=2 0.001->2
    e=3 0.51
- - 
e=1 0.00 e=1 0.00 e=1 0.00
  e=2 0.33 e=2 0.002->1
    e=3 0.00
- - 
e=1 18.06 e=1 0.00 e=1 0.00
  e=2 14.09 e=2 0.00
product 
quantity 
produced by 
manufacturer 
i at time 
period e and 
distributed to 
distributor j 
at time 
period t 2->2
    e=3 1.01
- - 
1->1 0.00 0.00 13.61 - - 
1->2 0.00 1.62 0.51 - - 
2->1 0.00 0.33 0.00 - - 
product 
quantity 
distributed  
from 
manufacturer 
i to 
distributor j 
at time 
period t 
2->2 18.06 14.09 1.01 - - 
1->1 - 0.00 0.33 12.96 - 
1->2 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
1->3 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
1->4 - 0.00 0.00 0.09 - 
1->5 - 0.00 0.00 0.57 - 
1->6 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
1->7 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
1->8 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
1->9 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
1->10 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
2->1 - 11.93 3.30 1.52 - 
2->2 - 1.08 0.00 0.00 - 
2->3 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
2->4 - 1.87 0.00 0.00 - 
2->5 - 2.12 0.00 0.00 - 
2->6 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 
2->7 - 0.16 0.00 0.00 - 
2->8 - 0.29 0.00 0.00 - 
2->9 - 0.61 0.00 0.00 - 
product 
quantity 
distributed  
from 
distributor j 
to retailer k at 
time interval 
t 
2->10 - 0.00 12.41 0.00 - 
1 - - 11.93 3.63 14.47 
2 - - 1.08 0.00 0.00 
3 - - 0.00 0.00 0.09 
4 - - 1.87 0.00 0.00 
product 
quantity of 
customers of 
retailer k 
5 - - 2.12 0.00 0.57 
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time period t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 
6 - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 
7 - - 0.16 0.00 0.00 
8 - - 0.29 0.00 0.00 
9 - - 0.61 0.00 0.00 
 
10 - - 0.00 12.41 0.00 
1->1 4.71 85.78 0.00 - - 
1->2 0.00 62.66 53.96 - - 
2->1 45.84 86.96 0.00 - - 
price of 
manufacturer 
i for 
distributor j 2->2 0.00 81.23 53.96 - - 
1 - 45.84 87.61 0.00 - price of 
distributor j 2 - 0.00 81.23 53.96 - 
1 - - 88.05 117.81 53.96 
2 - - 63.23 123.93 85.79 
3 - - 56.96 94.46 95.74 
4 - - 87.03 130.25 84.74 
5 - - 45.84 99.19 108.13 
6 - - - - - 
7 - - 72.13 100.77 96.32 
8 - - 89.96 87.61 91.58 
9 - - 80.32 120.25 98.95 
price of 
retailer k 
10 - - 74.32 111.08 74.74 
Table 10. Compromise solution of supply chain network integration 
 
member equilibrated solution compromise solution increment 
manufacturer 1 1094.03 1100.88 6.85 
manufacturer 2 1094.03 1100.88 6.85 
distributor 1 218.13 224.98 6.85 
distributor 2 218.13 224.98 6.85 
retailer 1 69.02 75.87 6.85 
retailer 2 55.61 62.46 6.85 
retailer 3 -3.38 3.47 6.85 
retailer 4 148.68 155.53 6.85 
retailer 5 138.93 145.78 6.85 
retailer 6 - - - 
retailer 7 -0.47 6.38 6.85 
retailer 8 13.69 20.54 6.85 
retailer 9 36.49 43.34 6.85 
retailer 10 -0.12 6.73 6.85 
total profit 3082.77 3171.81 89.04 
Table 11. Comparisons of profits for members of the supply chain network 
It is also found that if the manufacturers and distributors sell their products to the 
downstream buyers at lower prices, when the distributors share parts of their revenue with 
the manufacturers and the retailers share parts of their revenue with the distributors, higher 
profits for the manufacturers, distributors, and retailers can be achieved.  For example, at 
time period 1, distributor 2 gets free products from manufacturer 2.  Most of them are sold 
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to retailer 1 at the free price but they are sold to the customer market at the second highest 
price of the time period 3. Consequently, retailer 1 are asked to share 77.44% of retail 
revenue to distributor 2, but distributor 2 only can have 23.15% of shared retail revenue and 
the other 76.85% should be shared to manufacturer 2.  In addition, distributor 2 must share 
76.85% of wholesale revenue to manufacturer 2. 
 
equilibrated solution compromise solutiontime 
period 
retailer
price demand price demand 
1 87.97 8.06 88.05 11.93 
2 61.69 - 63.23 1.08 
3 54.84 - 56.96 - 
4 84.89 1.91 87.03 1.87 
5 44.84 - 45.84 2.12 
6 - - - - 
7 70.11 - 72.13 0.16 
8 85.92 3.96 89.96 0.29 
9 78.53 - 80.32 0.61 
t = 3 
10 72.21 - 74.32 - 
1 114.99 4.03 117.81 3.63 
2 117.04 8.13 123.93 - 
3 91.85 - 94.46 - 
4 120.12 14.29 130.25 - 
5 96.59 - 99.19 - 
6 - - - - 
7 98.17 - 100.77 - 
8 85.01 - 87.61 - 
9 115.25 4.54 120.25 - 
t = 4 
10 113.97 1.98 111.08 12.41 
1 58.47 - 53.96 14.47 
2 82.68 - 85.79 - 
3 91.94 1.41 95.74 0.09 
4 81.63 - 84.74 - 
5 98.10 13.72 108.13 0.57 
6 - - - - 
7 92.20 1.92 96.32 - 
8 88.47 - 91.58 - 
9 93.48 4.49 98.95 - 
t = 5 
10 71.63 - 74.74 - 
total - 68.44 - 49.22 
Table 12. Comparisons of retail prices and customers’ demands 
5. Conclusion 
The proposed compromise programming model can determine the selling price and revenue 
sharing ratios among the members of the supply chain and increase the profits for 
manufacturers, distributors and retailers, simultaneously. The supply chain network is 
successfully coordinated by adopting the revenue sharing contract. The results of the supply 
chain network equilibrium model provide the compromise benchmarks for the supply chain 
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network integration. This idea can be applied to explore the issue of supply chain integration 
by using other other negotiating coordination contracts of supply chain network.  Note that 
developing path-based algorithms is helpful in solving the medium and large size problems, 
in order to increase the practicability of the proposed variational inequality model. 
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